Once the legislature is faced with an exogenous budget constraint, public goods (both level and scope) have to be determined by some collective-choice procedure. We experimentally investigate a recent model in which legislators allocate a fixed budget between collective public goods and particularistic goods. Our results confirm many aspects of the model. In particular when legislators value of collective goods is relatively low the budget is almost exclusively allocated to particularistic goods within a minimum winning coalition. However, in the "mixed region" in which both collective goods and particularistic goods are provided, the share of the budget devoted to the public good decreases as the relative value of the public good decreases, which is inconsistent with the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction of the model but can be rationalized given how subjects voted.
Introduction
One of the most important questions in economics and political science is understanding how any collective body makes decisions, and, in particular, under what conditions we can expect an efficient provision of public goods by such collective bodies. Public good provision is a key aspect of what governments and legislatures do, with governments and legislatures typically being the most important suppliers of public goods. Even in countries where the government is not the most important supplier of public goods like health care and education, it is often the sole supplier of some key public goods such as defense and law enforcement. However, collective decision making bodies are far from being "benevolent unitary actors." Rather their members are constantly trading off the virtues of the public goods under consideration against the attractiveness of spending the money on particularistic goods (pork) benefiting themselves individually or their districts.
1 Theoretical and experimental methods can help clarify this trade-off, with our goal in this paper being to identify and characterize the behavioral patterns of a collective body facing these types of choices.
Most of the experimental literature on public good provision has focussed on voluntary contribution mechanisms, or provision point mechanisms, in which individual agents decide between allocating their personal endowment to their own private use or to benefit the group as a whole. Both of these mechanisms have a very different structure from the one legislators face in bargaining over budget allocations, as public goods (both level and scope) have to be determined by some collective-choice procedure, and there always are particularistic goods available as alternative ways to use the budget. Thus, we need to turn to a reasonably appropriate model that explicitly considers the political process by which public goods are provided to capture the competing forces at work in political institutions.
For the most part, legislative bargaining theory has focused either on distributive politics or on policy decisions. Only recently have there been major efforts to model legislators' incentives to provide public goods when the alternative use of the budget is to provide 1 Particularistic goods here can be local public goods in the sense that they primarily yield benefits within the district the legislator represents. In this sense public goods refer to more global public goods which are enjoyed by all districts.
particularistic goods that benefit an individual district. In its closed-rule, infinite-horizon form, someone is picked at random to make a proposal, then the others simultaneously vote yes or no on it. If the majority rejects the proposal then a new proposer is chosen at random, with the process repeating until an allocation is determined (with discounting on the size of the budget). 6 Legislators utility functions attach value to the public and private goods, with weights being the same across all legislators. This utility function and the weight associated with the value of public versus particularistic goods can be thought of as a reduced form expression incorporating the impact of the electoral system; e.g., in
systems where a politician's survival is determined more by what happens locally, then the weight put on public goods will be smaller than when their survival depends more on what happens nationally.
In our experiment we vary these weights across treatment conditions in order to produce
(1) a situation in which there is a unique equilibrium in which only public goods are provided (a dominant strategy for all players), (2) a mixed region in which both public and private goods are provided and (3) a region with a unique equilibrium with only private goods provided (within a minimum winning coalition; henceforth MWC). The model predicts, somewhat counterintuitively, that for intermediate values of the public good (the "mixed region"), the level of public goods provided increases when legislators care more about particularistic goods. This is because the proposer, in using the standard subgame perfect equilibrium logic, needs to offer a public good amount on the "participation constraint" of responders, and the latter would be violated if the proposer didn't increase the budget share devoted to the public good when its value decreases.
This comparative static prediction within the mixed region is quite important for comparative politics and for our understanding of economic policy making in different systems:
it is well known that when legislators are elected with Single Member District plurality or majority rule, they should care more about their performance for their district compared to legislators elected with national lists, like in many European countries. The prediction of the model in the mixed region, that the level of public goods will increase as legislators place greater weight on particularistic goods, suggests, in contrast with our intuition, that under some circumstances, single member district systems will induce legislators to produce more public goods than Proportional Representation systems. Empirical research with field data supports the fact that single member districts produce less public goods (more pork) compared to proportional representation systems (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2006) . But these results are clouded by the fact that the data for single member districts is dominated by the United States, which has a host of potentially confounding, idiosyncratic, factors associated with it. Our experimental investigation of the comparative static predictions of the Volden-Wiseman (2005) model within the mixed region provides another way of looking at this issue, one that is free from these (potential) confounding factors.
Our main experimental results can be summarized as follows: First, the level of public goods provided varies monotonically with the relative value of private versus public goods in the utility function, not only across regions but also within the mixed region. Within the pure private goods region, the predominant tendency is for minimum winning coalitions with no public goods. Within the pure public good region, the vast majority of offers are all public good. Within the mixed region there is a multiplicity of types of allocations, but over time, behavior slowly converges toward allocations with both public and private goods, with the latter allocated exclusively to the proposer (i.e., equilibrium type allocations). 7 In the mixed region, the overall allocation of public goods is substantially higher than the theory predicts, both because of all-public-good offers and the fact that the amount of money proposers take for themselves in equilibrium type offers is substantially smaller than predicted. The share of resources allocated to the public good is inconsistent with the comparative statics of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction within the mixed region, and this is true whether we ignore the all-public-good offers or we include them.
Our experiment also has implications for the public goods literature as it analyzes an entirely different framework for public good provision compared to voluntary contribution and provision point mechanisms that are typically investigated. Our results are similar in some dimensions to VCM and provision point experiments (e. g., the level of public good provision is higher than predicted throughout most of the mixed region), but, for parameter values where the theory predicts only private goods, there are virtually no public goods provided, nor much of an attempt to provide those goods at any point in an experimental session, which is inconsistent with the warm glow explanation for public goods provision with a voluntary contribution mechanism. The experiment also has implications for the "other regarding preference literature" that has grown up around bilateral bargaining games in the economics literature (i.e., concern for others' income that goes beyond the usual assumption that only own income matters). These implications are discussed in the concluding section of the paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the Volden-Wiseman (2005) model that serves as our benchmark. Sections 3 and 4 give the experimental design and the results, respectively. Summary and concluding remarks are reported in Section 5.
Benchmark Model and Related Hypotheses
In this section we describe the model of Volden and Wiseman (2005) .
Consider a legislature of N politicians, representing different legislative districts, who have to make a collective decision on how to allocate a fixed budget between a public good and private goods (pork barrel projects). Let N be an odd number. Denoting by y the share of the budget allocated to the public good and by x the N -dimensional vector of private good shares allocated to the N legislators (y + P N i=1 x i ≤ 1), the utility function of each legislator is given by
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the relative weight of private goods in the utility function 9 and q represents the absolute value (or return) of spending a dollar in public good production. 10 Each legislator has the same probability of being selected by Nature as the proposer of a division of the (unitary) budget. If at least (N − 1)/2 responders accept the proposal the budget is divided according to the proposal. If the majority rejects, another random proposer is selected, and the budget shrinks using the discount factor δ. The status quo is no budget allocation. The bargaining game is a straightforward extension of the (closed rule) infinite horizon bargaining game of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) 
The upper bound on the mixed region is given by
.
If α ≤ q/(1 + q) it is a dominant strategy to offer only public goods as particularistic have a lower marginal utility than the public good. If α ∈ (α CM , α MP ], a proposer has no incentive to deviate and offer all public goods even though such a proposal would surely be approved. The proposer prefers the mixed outcome to the all public goods outcome since he is better off taking a share of the budget for himself while still getting his proposal passed.
In the mixed region, as α increases, the proposer decreases the share of the budget he takes for himself in terms of private benefits. In other words, the theory predicts a non monotonic relationship between the supply of the public good and the value legislators place on private goods (α). Thus, starting with low values for the private good (low values of α) the private good share for the proposer is first zero, then once α reaches α CM it jumps up and then decreases within the mixed region, only to jump up again when the value of α becomes so high that no public good is offered anymore. Finally, when α is so high that only private goods are offered, the share going to the proposer remains constant for further increases in α.
Experimental Design
Each experimental session used a legislature/committee comprised of N = 5 subjects, with the value of the public good q = 0.7 and the discount factor δ = 0.8 constant for all treatments. Thus the range for the mixed region is given by [α CM , α MP ) = [0.412, 0.677).
The different values of α used in experimental treatments were 0.3, 0.45, 0.55, 0.65 and 0.75. N and δ were selected to correspond to values used in previous experimental studies of the BF game. Given those parameters, q was selected to provide a reasonably wide mixed region.
Subjects were told that they had to decide how to divide 50 "francs" between "... two types of allocations: (i) allocations to individual voters or (ii) allocations to the group of voters as a whole (called the group allocation)." They were told the payoff in francs allocated to the group as a whole as well as the payoff in dollars and that those were a function of "...francs allocated to you as an individual as well as your share of the group allocation."
Everything was computerized with subjects screens automatically calculating the conversion rate from the group allocation to individual payoffs, as well as the dollar payoffs for any proposed allocation.
11 Table 1 gives the equilibrium predictions for each value of α. The share of the budget devoted to the public good is reported as well as the share going to the proposer, along with payoffs (listed in dollars). Note that except for the case of pure private goods (α = 0.75),
shares to responders represent only payoffs from the public good. In the pure private goods case, shares are allocated only to members of the minimum winning coalition (MWC). Table 1 also shows the efficiency levels predicted under the SSPE. In all cases efficiency is maximized when y = 1 as this provides maximum total money payoffs. Efficiency is measured as the ratio of the difference in the sum of the utilities (monetary payoffs) in equilibrium and the sum of the utilities when y = 1.
Between 10 and 20 subjects were recruited for each experimental session, so that there would be a minimum of 2 bargaining rounds conducted simultaneously in each session and a maximum of 4. 12 After each bargaining round, subjects were randomly re-matched. Subject a Given to all responders.
b Given to coalition partners within a minimum winning coalition. within a given bargaining round).
Procedures for each bargaining round were as follows: First all subjects entered a proposal on how to allocate the 50 francs. Then one proposal was picked randomly to be the standing proposal. This proposal was posted on subjects' screens giving the amounts in francs allocated to each subject along with the dollar shares implied by the given allocation as determined by the utility function U i (x, y) along with the value of α in effect for that treatment. 13 Proposals were voted up or down, with no opportunity for amendment. If a simple majority accepted the proposal the payoff was implemented and the bargaining round ended. If the proposal was rejected, the process repeated itself (hence initiating a new stage of the same bargaining round). Complete voting results were posted on subjects' screens, giving the dollar amount allocated by subject number along with the francs allocated to the public good, whether that subject voted for or against the proposal, and whether the proposal passed or not.
14 A total of 15 sessions, all with inexperienced subjects, were conducted. Table 2 lists the sessions as a consequence of the number of subjects present. 13 For example, in the α = 0.55 treatment, if a proposal allocated 40 francs to the public good, and the remaining 10 francs to the proposer, subjects would see the implied dollar allocations ($12.60 for responders, $18.10 for the proposer) on their screens for all players along with the allocations in francs. 14 Screens also displayed the proposed shares and votes for the last three bargaining rounds as well as the proposed shares and votes for up to the past three stages of the current bargaining round. Other general information such as the number of votes required for a proposal to be accepted were also displayed. of α equal to 0.45 and 0.55, respectively. These were followed by another 8 bargaining rounds in which the value of α was changed from 0.45 to 0.55 in session 14 and from 0.55 to 0.45 in session 15. These cross-over sessions were conducted as the between session results with α = 0.45 and .55 failed to show the predicted increase in the budget share allocated to the public good. This design was employed to enable us to use own subject control to test this sensitive comparative static prediction of the model, and to provide subjects with the most striking contrast in terms of their own payoffs for the predicted increase (decrease) in public good allocation following the increase (decrease) in α that the theory predicts. In both of these sessions, subjects were paid on the basis of one random draw from each of the two sets of bargaining rounds. However, these draws were only made after both sets of bargaining rounds had been completed, while the planned change in the value of α, along with the extra 8 bargaining rounds, was only announced at the end of the first set of 12 bargaining rounds.
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Subjects were recruited through e-mail solicitations from students enrolled in economics classes at The Ohio State University. This resulted in recruiting a broad cross-section of undergraduate students. All subjects received a participation fee of $8 along with whatever monetary allocation they obtained from the randomly selected bargaining round(s). Sessions lasted between an hour and fifteen minutes and an hour and forty five minutes. Table 2 gives the minimum, maximum, and average earnings including the show-up fee for each session.
This design generates four central questions to be investigated with respect to the predictions of the model. (1) Do negotiations stop immediately (as predicted)? (2) Are proposals of "equilibrium type"? (3) Do we observe the predicted relation between α and y? (4) Do proposers exploit their power as predicted?
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. First, the performance of the SSPE predictions of the model will be evaluated in terms of the four questions noted above. These results will be organized by first presenting evidence dealing with the question at hand followed by a summary of the evidence in the form of a "Conclusion." Second, the main deviations from the theory identified in the mixed public and private good region will be explored further. Finally, we discuss the present results in relationship to results from other legislative bargaining experiments as well as their implications for the public goods literature and the other regarding preference literature.
Results

Testing the Theory
Most bargaining rounds had only 1 stage. More specifically, 86% of bargaining rounds ended in stage 1, 13% in stage 2, and 1% in stages greater than 2 (with 5 being the maximum number of stages in any bargaining round). These numbers are essentially unaffected when looking at rounds 10 and above when subjects would have had more experience with the game. The number of subjects included in proposals is reported in Table 3 . More specifically, it reports the number of subjects who are offered strictly positive amounts of private goods.
When looking at all rounds, the modal offer yields private benefits to as many subjects as the equilibrium predicts with α = 0.30, 0.55 and 0.75. The two notable exceptions are α = 0.45 and 0.65, at either end of the mixed region. Equilibrium type offers are more frequent for all treatments in rounds 10 and above, indicative of within session learning in all cases.
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The α = 0.3 condition reveals some inefficiencies as 20% of all proposals involve some private goods. However, these misallocations are relatively small in magnitude, as the 17 Given that most of the data is in stage 1, the data analysis that follows uses stage 1 data only, unless noted otherwise. This is done for convenience, as it makes comparisons simpler since we do not have to worry about the effect of discounting on payoffs. 18 For the cross-over sessions we include data for all 8 bargaining rounds after the change in α when characterizing experienced play (periods 10 and above). We do so on the grounds that subjects are already quite familiar with the structure of the game. Results for experienced play are robust to limiting the data to the last 3 bargaining periods before and after the crossover. Conclusion 2 The modal offer yields private benefits to as many subjects as the theory predicts with the exception of α = 0.45 and α = 0.65, with too many all public good offers in the first case and too many players receiving private goods in the second case. There is learning/adjustment going on within sessions in that equilibrium type offers are more common in later bargaining rounds for all values of α. Table 4 gives the average proposed share of francs allocated to the public good by treatment for all proposals and for equilibrium type proposals. 20 It also lists what the equilibrium prediction is. Public good allocations are only slightly smaller, on average, when going from α = 0.3 to α = 0.45. However, the distributions are statistically different between these two treatments (rank sum test, p-value < 0.1 for all rounds and < 0.05 for rounds 10 and above). 21 All of the other pairwise comparisons of the distribution of public good allocations between treatments are statistically significant at the 1% level or better.
In particular, there is a statistically significant decrease in the budget share devoted to public goods going from α = 0.45 to α = 0.55 and then to α = 0.65, contrary to what 19 The appendix contains a table equivalent to Table 3 except that it only includes accepted offers. The relative frequencies are very similar to those shown in Table 3 . 20 Average accepted shares are quite similar to proposed shares, see Table 9 in the appendix. 21 Throughout the paper averages, frequencies, and other descriptive statistics use all the relevant data whereas statistical tests average all the observations for a given subject first, and use the subject average as the unit of observation, except when regressions are estimated. the theory predicts. 22 This difference, although relatively small going from α = 0.45 to α = 0.55 is quite robust. For example suppose that we drop all the subjects who always propose only public goods with α = 0.45 on the grounds that they are simply miscalibrated, which biases the average allocation against what the theory predicts. 23 Then looking at the cross-over sessions, using own subject differences as the unit of observation, the average share of the budget allocated to the public good for all proposals for all rounds is 0.88 with α = 0.45 versus 0.78 with α = 0.55, and 0.89 versus 0.83 in rounds 10 and above, with both these differences statistically significant at the 5% level. Going from α = 0.55 to α = 0.65, the decrease in the budget share going to public goods is quite dramatic, in large measure because of the large number of proposals allocating private goods to three players instead of one. Finally, note the small share allocated to the public good with α = 0.75, close to the misallocation (but in the opposite direction) to α = 0.3.
The average proposed share of francs allocated to the public good, conditional on the proposal being an equilibrium type offer, decreases between α = 0.3 and α = 0.45. What is more interesting is the observation that the average share of resources allocated to the public good also decreases going from α = 0.45 to α = 0.55, and from α = 0.55 to α = 0.65 as this contradicts one of the key comparative static predictions of the model.
The flip side of this is that if we look at the share of the private good that proposers allocate to themselves, conditional on equilibrium type allocations (public goods with only private goods to themselves), the average private share for accepted offers goes from 0.111 with α = 0.45 to 0.135 for α = 0.55 to 0.181 for α = 0.65. The null hypothesis that the data from these three treatments come from the same population can be rejected using a Kruskal-Wallis test at the 1% level. 24 Focussing on the cross-over sessions, using own subject differences as the unit of observation, the null hypothesis that the data for α = 0.45 and α = 0.55 come from the same distribution can be rejected (p-value < 0.1 using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test). These differences seem to be decreasing slightly over time 22 This is established two ways. One way is using the ranksum test for all rounds except those after round 12. The other is using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test using data from the cross-over sessions.
In both cases we can reject a null hypothesis of no difference in favor of a smaller allocation with α = 0.55 at the 0.01 level or better. 23 This accounts for 9 out of 25 subjects for all rounds and 11 out of 25 subjects for rounds 10 or higher in the cross-over sessions. 24 Data from period 13 on in the cross-over sessions are not included since the analysis is based on subject data averages which are probably not independent for a given subject before and after cross-over. Average All = averages for all accepted offers.
Avg. Eq. Type = averages for equilibrium type offers. * Average over all 4 responders even when less than 4 subjects are allocated strictly positive amounts. Conclusion 3 Public good provision decreases monotonically as α increases, contrary to the model's prediction within the mixed public and private region going from α = 0.45 to α = 0.55 and 0.65. Table 5 gives the SSPE prediction in terms of public versus particularistic good allocations, as well as the payoffs to the proposer and responder. It also reports the average for all accepted offers, and the average conditional on the accepted offer being an equilibrium type allocation. 25 Note that in the case of α = 0.75, since the equilibrium calls for a MWC, responders payoffs must be multiplied by 2 to know how much coalition partners within the To summarize, the theory performs well in many dimensions. First, subjects almost always agree on a division in round 1 as predicted. Second, there is some proposer power in both the mixed region and in the all private goods region. Third, the share of the budget allocated to public goods decreases going from α = 0.3 to α = 0.45 and from α = 0.65 to α = 0.75. There are however four main deviations from the theory. First, the extent to which proposer power is exercised is far from what is predicted in the SSPE. Second, in the α = 0.45 treatment the modal offer is an all public goods offer. Third, in the α = 0.65 treatment the modal offer in the last three rounds consists of an equilibrium type offer, but this is not the case when all rounds are considered. Fourth, the fraction of resources 25 Up to this point, tables used all the data with the equivalent table restricting attention to accepted offers in the Appendix. The advantage of not using only accepted offers is mainly increased sample size.
The reason for the change of focus here to only accepted offer is that proposer power (which is what this table is used to study) is only relevant to the extent that it can be exercised. If proposers ask for a lot, but their offers are rejected, then they do not have proposer power.
allocated to public goods decreases as α increases within the mix region.
In the next section we focus on these differences from equilibrium predictions within the mixed region. Of particular interest is the observation that contrary to the theory, the fraction of resources allocated to public goods decreases as α increases within the mix region as it contradicts one of the key comparative static predictions of the VM's extension of the BF model. Experience with experimental outcomes has taught us, and most of the profession, that the main gravitational forces inherent in any given model will often be at play even though the point predictions of the model are not satisfied. However, breakdowns in comparative static predictions of equilibrium models are rarer as well as suggestive of more fundamental deficiencies in the model, so that we take them much more seriously.
Deviations from Equilibrium Predictions in the Mixed Region
This section elaborates on the main factors we believe underlie the lack of equilibrium type proposals with α = 0.45 and 0.65, as well as the failure of public good allocations to increase within the mixed region (α = 0.45 to α = 0.65) as the theory predicts. First, for all values of α within the mixed region players' first impulse is not to provide equilibrium type allocations. This is shown in Table 6 which reports proposals in the first bargaining round of each treatment: these average 12% of all proposals in the mixed region. This is substantially less than the round one frequency of equilibrium type proposals for α = 0.30 or 0.75. Further, as shown in Figure 1 , there are steady increases in the frequency of equilibrium type allocations for all values of α within the mixed region, which, arguably, at least for α = 0.55 or 0.65, would ultimately result in frequencies of equilibrium type allocations like those reported for α = 0.30 and 0.75 as subjects gained more experience.
In this context, one reason why the frequency of equilibrium type allocations in rounds 10 and above within the mixed region are less than those found with α = 0.30 or 0.75 (recall Table 3 ) is that they have far more ground to make up compared to these other treatments.
Beside initial tendencies, voting patterns of responders place constraints on what kinds of proposals will be passed. In particular voting behavior limits the amount of proposer power that can be exercised. Table 7 shows this, where votes are regressed on own payoffs as well as payoffs to the proposer (votes of proposers are excluded from these regressions).
Own payoff is significant in every treatment. However, for the mixed region the payoff to the proposer has a negative impact on the likelihood that a proposal will be accepted, which 1 Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% § significant at 10%; § § significant at 5%; § § § significant at 1% using a likelihood ratio test Table 7 : Random Effects probit Estimates of the Determinants of Vote limits the ability of proposers to exploit their power. This is especially true for the α = 0.45 treatment.
These voting patterns impact the growth of, and the nature of, equilibrium type allocations within the mixed region. In particular, they go a long way to account for the fact that for α = 0.45, all public good allocations grow faster than equilibrium type allocations (from 0.11 in round 1 to 0.53 in rounds 10 and above for all public good type allocations versus 0.11 to 0.40 for equilibrium type allocations). With α = 0.45 the average payoff to proposers for equilibrium type allocations that are passed averaged $0.26 more than for an all public good allocation ($19.51 versus $19.25) . This small increase in proposers' payoffs for an equilibrium type allocation comes at a price (and at a minimum with more risk) as 14% of equilibrium type allocations are rejected for α = 0.45 as opposed to no rejections of all public good type allocations. Thus, for α = 0.45, there is little to be gained from an equilibrium type allocation compared to an all public good type allocation, with some risk of rejection with the resulting shrinkage in the budget available to be allocated. In contrast, with α = 0.55 proposers earned $1.42 more than with the all public good allocation, a stronger incentive to providing equilibrium type proposals as opposed to an all public good type allocation, with essentially no difference in the likelihood of these proposals being rejected (14% rejection rate for α = 0.45 versus 13% for α = 0.55). (All public good allocations continued to be passed 100% of the time for α = 0.55.) For the α = 0.65 the main rival in round one to an equilibrium type allocation is one in which private goods are allocated to the proposer and two other players (a MWC type allocation, albeit, one with a reasonably large share of the budget allocated to public goods as well; 24% of the budget in round one for these types of proposals on average). It takes proposers some time to figure out that they can get more on average from equilibrium type allocations than from MWC type allocations, while also having a better chance of their proposal being accepted: $15.86 versus $13.86, with 85% of equilibrium type allocations being passed compared to 75% of MWC type allocations passing.
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The evolution of equilibrium type proposals over time suggests that they would dominate for α = 0.55 and 0.65, if not for α = 0.45. However, the same cannot be said for the comparative static prediction that the share of budgets allocated to the public good will increase as α increases in the mixed region. First, as already noted all public good allocations grow even faster than equilibrium type allocations for α = 0.45. This implies that the share of the budget devoted to public goods decreases going from α = 0.45 to α = 0.55 regardless of how many rounds we let them play. (Also recall that we get a decrease in the share of the budget allocated to public goods going from α = 0.45 to α = 0.55 in the crossover sessions even excluding subjects who always propose all public good allocations with α = 0.45). Two additional results find a parallel in our earlier studies of the BF model. First, most bargaining rounds end in stage 1. That result has been observed in all of our prior experiments. Second, the fact that proposer's share, which is typically greater than shares offered to coalition partners, negatively affects voting has also been observed in one or more treatments in each of our previous studies of the BF model (FKL, FKMa, FKLc). experiments with only particularistic goods) indicates that subjects do not have maximin preferences. That is, a taste for maximizing the benefits for the least well off (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Englemann and Strobel, 2004) . 28 Second, in the region where the model predicts only private goods, subjects had the opportunity to provide a perfectly egalitarian distribution that was also a more efficient allocation (in the sense of providing more total benefits) than the minimum winning coalitions obtained, by making an all public good allocation. Nevertheless, all public good allocations only accounted for 3% of all proposals, even though such proposals were almost certain to be passed. Rather subjects opted overwhelmingly for minimum winning coalitions which provided greater benefits to the members of the coalition than they could have gotten with an all public good allocation. These results are inconsistent with recent suggestions from the other regarding preferences literature that subjects have a taste for efficiency (see, for example, Charness and Rabin, 2002) . There are several obvious differences between the present experiment and these other experiments:
namely the present experiment involves bargaining and these other studies involved simple dictator games. In a dictator version of our game, presumably the fear of the consequences of a rejection could make proposers opt more often for an all public good proposal, but the results in our bargaining framework show that even if that were the case the interpretation of such a result would not be a taste for efficiency or maximin concerns.
Another type of other regarding preference proposed to explain over provision of public goods in VCM experiments is the "warm glow" effect -the good feeling subjects get for helping others. Although the warm glow might be part of the reason why more than predicted public goods are provided in the mixed region, it is inconsistent with the fact that almost no public goods are provided with α = 0.75. That treatment is really the one that comes in sharpest contrast with the warm glow explanation of public goods provision in VCM experiments because it is in many ways similar to it. In both cases the equilibrium prediction is for no public goods to be provided. And in both cases it is more efficient for all the resources to go toward the public good. However, unlike in the VCM experiments there is almost no provision of public good here with α = 0.75. And this occurs right from the start in that there is no more public good provision than private good provision with α = 0.3 where it's dominant to provide only public goods. This is not to say there are no similarities with VCM experiments as there is over provision of public goods in the mixed region, but over provision in the present case does not seem to result primarily from a warm glow effect. Finally the level of public good provision in the mixed region does not go away or decrease systematically over time as in the typical VCM experiment. The latter is most often attributed to learning and/or end game effects in a repeated play game setting. However, in the present case public good provision is an equilibrium prediction within a one-shot game which, if anything tends to increase over time for each treatment within the mixed region (if only because equilibrium type allocations increase).
Conclusions
We investigated a simple model of public goods provision within a legislative bargaining framework. In the model, legislators/committee members have preferences over public and private goods that they must decide between under a fixed budget constraint. (Taxes required to support the budget are exogenous to the model.) Our experimental treatment conditions focus on varying the weight subjects place on public versus private goods, spanning the range of predicted outcomes from all public goods, to mixed public and private goods, to exclusively private goods. We put special emphasis on the mixed region with its counterintuitive prediction that public good provision will increase as the value of the public good decreases. The model also predicts that in the mixed region, private goods will be allocated only to the proposer, the expression of proposer power within the mixed region.
Many of the predictions of the model find support, while the main deviations are found in the mixed region, where equilibrium behavior is far from intuitive. Within the mixed region we find that (i) overall when private goods are provided, in the majority of cases they go exclusively to proposers, as the theory predicts, (ii) in the lower part of the mixed region there is excess provision of public goods relative to what the theory predicts because of the high frequency of all public good allocations, and the lower then predicted levels of private goods proposers' take with equilibrium type allocations, (iii) while in the upper part of the mixed region there are too many MWC type offers, and (iv) the level of public good provision falls as the value of the public goods decreases, contrary to the model's predictions.
Our results have several implications for the legislative bargaining literature. First, the fact that as the weight legislators place on private goods increases, the share of particularistic goods provided within the mixed region increases, supports the intuition, as well as the empirical literature, that single member districts tend to produce more pork than do legislators elected from national lists. This support for the empirical literature comes without the confounding factors associated with comparing outcomes between nation states with their different cultures, histories, and other potential confounding factors. Second, the reduction in the supply of public goods as the weight placed on private goods (α) increases within the mixed region directly contradicts the comparative static prediction of the Volden-Wiseman model under the SSPE refinement, the standard refinement for games of this sort. Rather this outcome can be rationalized by agents' voting patterns, and the actual proposals made in response to (or in anticipation of) these voting patterns.
A Additional Results
Both tables in the appendix need to be redone. 
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